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137 
INSPECTING THE HANDS THAT FEED US: 
REQUIRING U.S. QUALITY FOR ALL  
IMPORTED FOODS 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty years, serious outbreaks of foodborne illnesses in 
the United States have been linked to imported foods.1 In late 2003, 
contaminated Mexican green onions served in a Pennsylvania restaurant 
resulted in over 550 illnesses and three deaths across seven states.2 In 
1997, Guatemalan raspberries caused an outbreak of Cyclospora that 
resulted in 1,012 illnesses throughout seventeen states, Washington, D.C. 
and Canada.3 That same year, Mexican frozen strawberries were 
implicated in an outbreak of Hepatitis A that caused 270 illnesses in five 
states.4 These and other outbreaks were caused by foods under the 
jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), highlighting the 
need for legislative reform of its authority regarding import controls. 
Americans are becoming increasingly reliant on foods produced 
internationally, evidenced by the recent steep rise of the import shares5 of 
various products. Between 1980 and 2000, the import share of fruits in the 
United States rose dramatically, climbing from six to twenty-two percent. 
The import shares of fish and shellfish, and of fresh and frozen vegetables, 
reached sixty-eight and fourteen percent, respectively.6 In 1995, eighty-
 
 
 1. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), REP. NO. GAO/RCED-98-103, FEDERAL 
EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF IMPORTED FOODS ARE INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE 47 
(1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98103.pdf [hereinafter GAO INCONSISTENT 
AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT] (Appendix 1, Selected Outbreaks of Foodborne Illnesses Linked 
to Imported Foods, 1983–1997).  
 2. Caroline Smith DeWaal, Rising Imports, Bioterrorism, and the Food Supply, 59 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 433, 433 (2004). See also Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), Outbreak Alert! 
Closing the Gaps in Our Federal Food-Safety Net 10 (2005) [hereinafter Outbreak Alert! 2005] (“At 
least thirteen of the cases were restaurant employees, and seventy-five were residents of six other 
states who dined at the restaurant. . . . Green onions imported from the same farm in Mexico had 
caused outbreaks in three states prior to the detection of this larger, deadly outbreak.”). 
 3. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 47 (compiling data 
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)).  
 4. Id. Perhaps the most crippling outbreak between 1983 and 1997 occurred in 1989, when 
Mexican cantaloupes caused 25,000 illnesses in thirty states. 
 5. “Import share” refers to the “ratio of imported volume to total volume consumed as food.” 
Alberto Jerardo, The Import Share of U.S.-Consumed Food Continues to Rise, ELECTRONIC OUTLOOK 
REPORT FROM THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE 2 (U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)) 
(2002), http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/erssor/trade/fau-bb/text/2002/fau66-01.pdf [hereinafter 
USDA ELECTRONIC OUTLOOK REPORT].  
 6. Id. at 3. 
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five percent of broccoli used for processing in the United States was 
imported.7 These statistics represent a 22.1 percent increase in the total 
consumption of internationally-produced fish and shellfish since 1980, and 
an 833 percent increase for broccoli.8 In July 2007 the Washington Post 
reported that “about 13 percent of the average American’s diet is imported 
food, and imports of FDA-regulated food have more than doubled since 
2000, to 9 million shipments in 2006.”9 As a result, our food supply has 
become more vulnerable to contamination, either accidentally (raising 
food safety concerns) or intentionally (raising food security concerns).10 
This Note discusses import controls solely as they relate to food safety 
concerns.11  
 
 
 7. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (citing the 
USDA Economic Research Service). 
 8. Id. From a safety monitoring perspective, this is not necessarily a positive trend. See Richard 
A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 
61, 96 (2001) (“The growing share of the U.S. food supply made up of imported foods is a source of 
concern among some members of Congress and public health groups.”). 
 9. Renae Merle & Michael Abramowitz, FDA Faulted In Safety Lapses: White House Orders 
Study of Imports, WASH. POST, July 18, 2007, at D1.  
 10. See Mark B. McClellan, Remarks of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 58 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 191 (2003). See also World Health Organization (WHO), Food Safety Department, FOOD SAFETY 
ISSUES: TERRORIST THREATS TO FOOD, GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING AND STRENGTHENING 
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE SYSTEMS 6 (2002) (observing that “food is . . . vulnerable to international 
contamination by debilitating or lethal agents” and that “the global market[] makes prevention 
difficult, if not impossible”). 
 Food safety concerns have also become greater in recent years. See The Safety of Food Imports: 
Fraud and Deception in the Food Import Process—Part III and Improving the Safety of Food 
Imports—Part IV Before the Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental 
Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of William B. Schultz, Deputy Commission for Policy, FDA), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t980924c.html [hereinafter Schultz Testimony] (“[M]ore 
and more food imports consist of finished, value added foods (e.g., cooked, ready-to-eat, quick frozen 
shrimp as opposed to raw shrimp for cooking/processing in this country). As products receive 
additional processing, the potential for the product becoming contaminated and a potential public 
health hazard increases.”). 
 11. For an introduction to the FDA’s role in addressing food security concerns, see Joseph A. 
Levitt, CFSAN’s Program Priorities: From Food Safety to Food Security, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 19 
(2003). Though outside the specific focus of this Note, food security concerns are not to be taken 
lightly: in 1984, “a cult group poisoned some salad bars in some Oregon restaurants with Salmonella 
bacteria, and about 750 people became ill.” GAO, REP. NO. GAO-03-342, FOOD-PROCESSING 
SECURITY: VOLUNTARY EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY, BUT FEDERAL AGENCIES CANNOT FULLY ASSESS 
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03342.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO VOLUNTARY EFFORTS REPORT]. The purpose of the contamination was “to prevent 
people from voting in a local election.” GAO, REP. NO. GAO-02-47T, FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY: 
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES NEEDED TO ENSURE SAFE FOOD 15 (Oct. 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0247t.pdf [hereinafter GAO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES REPORT]. 
More recently, in 2002, thirty-eight people were killed when a Chinese baker spiked a competitor’s 
flour with rat poison; in 2003, over 100 people fell ill when 200 pounds of meat at a Michigan grocery 
store were intentionally poisoned. DeWaal, supra note 2, at 434. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/6
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The federal food safety system vests responsibility for imported foods 
and food products12 with two agencies: the Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS), which operates under the umbrella of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), and the FDA.13 The FSIS has jurisdiction over 
meat, poultry and some egg products while the FDA has jurisdiction over 
all other foods. As a result, the FDA generally maintains responsibility for 
eighty percent of our nation’s food supply.14 Both agencies, however, 
legally must warrant that shipments under their jurisdiction comply with 
U.S. standards for safety and wholesomeness.15  
Specifically, the USDA must ensure that imported foods “meet U.S. 
standards for safety and wholesomeness, and comply with U.S. labeling 
and packaging requirements” while the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (FFDCA), the FDA’s governing legislation, “requires imported 
products to comply with U.S. standards for purity, wholesomeness, safety, 
and hygiene.”16 The FSIS, as part of the USDA, uses its legislatively-
granted “equivalency authority” to mandate foreign compliance with those 
standards.17 The FDA, on the other hand, lacks this necessary statutory 
 
 
2001, have caused a heightened awareness of the potential dangers of the intentional contamination of 
the food supply as a vehicle for terrorist attacks. See infra note 114.  
 12. Hereinafter, the term “food” is used to apply to both food and food products. 
 13. GAO, REP. NO. GAO/RCED-91-19A, FOOD SAFETY AND QUALITY: WHO DOES WHAT IN 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3–4 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d21t9/142970.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO WHO DOES WHAT REPORT]. The FSIS is a subdivision of the USDA and the FDA is 
an agency under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Id. 
  Domestic food safety “is governed by a highly complex system that is based on more than 
thirty laws and administered by twelve agencies. In addition, there are over fifty interagency 
agreements to govern the combined food safety oversight responsibilities of the various agencies.” 
GAO, REP. NO. GAO-04-588T, FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEM: FUNDAMENTAL 
RESTRUCTURING IS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION AND OVERLAP 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04588t.pdf [hereinafter GAO FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING 
REPORT].  
 Even domestically, however, the FDA and the USDA “have most of the regulatory responsibilities 
for ensuring the safety of the nation’s food supply and account for most federal food safety spending.” 
Id. at 2–3.  
 14. GAO WHO DOES WHAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 3–4. 
 15. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Specifically, 
all poultry, or parts or products of poultry, capable of use as human food offered for 
importation into the United States shall . . . be subject to inspection, sanitary, quality, species 
verification, and residue standards that achieve a level of sanitary protection equivalent to that 
achieved under United States standards; and [shall] have been processed in facilities and 
under conditions that achieve a level of sanitary protection equivalent to that achieved under 
United States standards. 
21 U.S.C. § 466(d) (2006). See also 21 U.S.C. §§ 620(f) and 1046(a)(2) (2006) (codifying the parallel 
equivalency requirements for imported meat and egg products, respectively). Interestingly, at least one 
court has held that “the same” standards means “identical” as opposed to “at least equal to,” thereby 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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authority.18 In a study of 5,000 outbreaks of foodborne illnesses involving 
152,097 individual cases that occurred between 1990 and 2004, FDA-
regulated foods were associated with twice as many outbreaks as those 
regulated by the USDA.19 Left unresolved, this problem will only worsen 
as the number of imports continues to rise. 
“Equivalency authority” refers to the requirement that foreign food 
production systems operate under standards equivalent to those enforced 
domestically before a country may export its food to the United States.20 
The FSIS has the ability to do this; the FDA does not.21 As a result, in 
2006, only thirty-two countries were authorized to export meat and poultry 
to the U.S.;22 shipments of these products from anywhere else are 
automatically re-exported to the source country.23  
Conversely, all other foods can legally be imported from anywhere. For 
example, more than eighty percent of seafood consumed by Americans is 
imported from approximately 160 nations.24 In 2006, seafood shipments 
 
 
prohibiting importation of meat and poultry from countries with superior food safety systems. See 
Mississippi Poultry Ass’n, Inc. v. Madigan, 31 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 1994) (justifying its seemingly 
misplaced holding by pointing to a failure on the part of the Secretary of Agriculture to present 
evidence of a food safety system superior to that of the U.S., thus rendering irrelevant the “identical” 
versus “at least equal to” distinction).  
 18. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 22. 
 19. See CSPI, Outbreak Alert! Closing the Gaps in Our Federal Food-Safety Net 5 (Dec. 2006) 
[hereinafter Outbreak Alert! 2006]. These results are eerily similar to those found one year earlier: of 
4,486 outbreaks occurring between 1990 and 2003, involving 138,622 individual cases, “FDA-
regulated foods were linked to 2,954 outbreaks with 83,076 cases, while USDA-regulated foods were 
linked to 1,229 outbreaks with 38,577 cases.” Outbreak Alert! 2005, supra note 2, at 4. Additionally, 
the two “single-food vehicles” linked to the most outbreaks were seafood and produce, both of which 
are regulated by the FDA. Id. 
 20. Outbreak Alert! 2005, supra note 2, at 4. 
 21. The result is a “disjointed American food-safety system,” through which a consumer dining 
out on steak and shrimp may be unaware that:  
[t]he steak came from a cow that was examined by a government inspector before and after it 
was slaughtered. The shrimp most likely were not inspected. The steak probably came from 
an American producer. The shrimp likely came from overseas, perhaps from one of several 
Asian countries that have been criticized for sloppy practices in raising seafood.  
Renae Merle, Two Very Different Paths From Farm to Table: Bifurcated Safety System Means Some 
Foods Get Less Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2007, at D1. 
 22. Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND PLANTS CERTIFIED TO 
EXPORT MEAT AND POULTRY TO THE UNITED STATES, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_ 
&_policies/Eligible_Foreign_Establishments/index.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). The FSIS notes that 
Mexico is only approved to export poultry products slaughtered in the U.S. under Federal inspection or 
in another eligible exporting country. Additionally, Canada is the only nation authorized to export egg 
products to the U.S. Id. 
 23. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 22. 
 24. GAO, REP. NO. GAO-04-246, FDA’S IMPORTED SEAFOOD SAFETY PROGRAM SHOWS SOME 
PROGRESS, BUT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d04246.pdf [hereinafter GAO IMPORTED SEAFOOD PROGRAM REPORT] (analyzing data 
compiled by the CDC between 1993–1997 and published in Mar. 2000). The GAO notes that, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/6
p 137 Goldstein book pages.doc12/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2008] INSPECTING THE HANDS THAT FEED US 141 
 
 
 
 
from China alone were valued at $1.9 billion, a monetary increase of 193 
percent since 2001.25 Seafood provides a critical example of an FDA-
regulated food that causes a significant number of foodborne illnesses. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that between 
1993 and 1997 “contaminated seafood . . . accounted for about 15 percent 
of the documented foodborne illness outbreaks in the United States – a 
greater percentage than either meat or poultry, even though meat and 
poultry [which are not regulated by the FDA] are consumed at eight and 
six times the rate of seafood, respectively.”26 In fact, seafood and produce 
(also regulated by the FDA) topped the list of all foods responsible for 
illnesses.27 
This Note offers a twofold proposal: first, that legislation granting the 
FDA equivalency authority matching that of the FSIS is necessary to 
ensure the safety of imported food in the U.S. and to adequately protect 
Americans’ health; and second, that the FDA requires additional 
resources, primarily in the form of increased funding and oversight, to 
effectively implement and enforce that new authority. Part I outlines the 
current procedures used when a food shipment is received at the U.S. 
border by the Department of Customs and Border Protection (Customs) 
under the FSIS and FDA regulatory schemes. 
Part II explains how the lack of equivalency authority renders the FDA 
unable to ensure the safety of imported foods because of insufficient 
resources. Consequences of this insufficiency include: a vast majority of 
shipments escape inspection; ineffective methods are employed at the 
border with respect to inspected shipments; the FDA’s reliance on self-
reported data creates loopholes through which unscrupulous importers 
frequently slip; and ineffective containment procedures combined with 
unclear communication with Customs officials results in FDA-rejected 
shipments mistakenly entering domestic commerce.28 Comparisons are 
made throughout this Note to the FSIS’s ability to better guard against 
similar hazards concerning the importation of meat and poultry products 
through the application and enforcement of its equivalency authority.  
 
 
“[a]ccording to the National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the percentage of imported seafood is based on live weight.” Id. at n.1. 
 25. Andrew Martin, F.D.A. Curbs Sale of Five Seafoods Farmed in China, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 
2007, at A1. 
 26. GAO IMPORTED SEAFOOD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 24, at 1. 
 27. Seafood was linked to 984 outbreaks involving 9,969 illnesses while produce was linked to 
639 outbreaks involving 31,496 illnesses. Outbreak Alert! 2006, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
 28. See infra notes 90–112 and accompanying text. 
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Part III first outlines two initiatives that would give the FDA more 
authority and control over imported foods: the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 200229 (Bioterrorism Act 
of 2002) and, specifically regarding seafood, the Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) system,30 fully implemented in 1997. This 
Part then explains why these two initiatives are not fungible substitutes for 
equivalency authority.  
Part IV demonstrates that widespread support exists for the proposition 
that the FDA needs equivalency authority in addition to increased 
resources to effectively perform its duties. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has released numerous reports with this 
recommendation,31 as has the Center for Science in the Public Interest 
(CSPI),32 and bills to this effect have been repeatedly introduced in both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate.33 Additionally, FDA officials 
have commented on the need for equivalency authority.34 Furthermore, the 
international community, speaking through the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (Codex), has adopted guidelines for establishing equivalence 
agreements.35 Codex, created jointly by the United Nations Food and 
 
 
 29. Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002) [hereinafter Bioterrorism Act of 2002]. 
 30. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 123 & 1240 (1997) (final rule requiring application of HACCP principles to 
domestic and imported seafood). 
 31. See generally GAO FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING REPORT, supra note 13. See also GAO 
IMPORTED SEAFOOD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 24; GAO, REP. NO. GAO/T-RCED-98-271, FOOD 
SAFETY: WEAK AND INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED CONTROLS ALLOW UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD TO 
ENTER U.S. COMMERCE (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98271t.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT]; GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS 
REPORT, supra note 1. 
 32. See Outbreak Alert! 2005, supra note 2, at 15. 
 33. See, e.g., Safe and Secure Food Act of 2005, S. 1534 109th Cong. § 301(b); Imported Food 
Safety Act of 2001, H.R. 3075 107th Cong. § 3(a) (proposing to amend FFDCA to require “prior 
approval” of Secretary for imported foods). 
 34. “FDA . . . agree[s] . . . that it is imperative that Congress enact legislation giving FDA 
authority to require that, as a condition to exporting to the United States, foreign governments adopt 
adequate measures in their own countries to ensure that food exported to the U.S. is safe.” Press 
Statement from Dr. Michael Friedman, Lead Deputy Commissioner of the FDA, on GAO Food Safety 
Report (May 11, 1998), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00639.html (responding to the 
GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1). See also FDA, Center for 
Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), Affirmative Agenda for International Activities (Dec. 
1999), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/intlact.html#IV (establishing, inter alia, the following 
“International Priorities” for 2000–2002: strengthening the FDA’s participation in the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, see infra note 35; establishing guidance on equivalence criteria for foods; 
conducting foreign equivalence evaluations; assessing the food safety and food production systems of 
other countries; and enhancing the safety of imported foods at their source).  
 In recent years, the FDA has backed away slightly from its endorsement of mandatory 
equivalency authority, instead suggesting discretionary authority to enter into voluntary equivalence 
agreements with willing nations. 
 35. See, e.g., CODEX, GUIDELINE NO. CAC/GC 34-1999, GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/6
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Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) in 1963, develops global food safety standards.36  
This Note concludes by arguing that increased resources and 
mandatory equivalency authority, granted either through an amendment to 
the FFDCA or through separate legislation, is the most effective and 
efficient way for the FDA to adequately minimize the risk of foodborne 
illnesses posed by imported foods under its jurisdiction. While both 
individuals and groups have asserted strenuously that the FDA lacks 
necessary resources,37 this Note contends that merely throwing money at 
the problem is an unsatisfactory solution. It is only by coupling increased 
funding with authority to address unsanitary growing and preparatory 
conditions at the source—namely, exporting facilities—that the FDA will 
be able to use expanded resources efficiently to guarantee the quality of 
food imports. 
I 
When a shipment of food under either the FSIS’s or the FDA’s 
jurisdiction arrives at the U.S. border, Customs officials first notify the 
proper agency.38 Next, Customs conditionally releases the shipment to the 
importer, provided that the correct paperwork is in order.39 Thereafter, the 
protocols followed by the FSIS and the FDA deviate considerably from 
one another, largely as a result of the FDA’s inability to mandate 
equivalence.40  
 
 
OF EQUIVALENCE AGREEMENTS REGARDING FOOD IMPORT AND EXPORT INSPECTION AND 
CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS (1999), available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/ 
362/CXG_ 034e.pdf.  
 36. Codex Alimentarius, http://www.codexalimentarius.net (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). See also 
Jørgen Schlundt, Wim van Eck & Mary Vallanjon, Editorial: WHO and FAO Have a Recipe for Safer 
Food, BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 315 (2003), http://www.who.int/bulletin/ 
volumes/81/5/Schlundt0503.pdf. 
 37. According to the New York Times, detractors of the FDA contend that the agency “is 
woefully underfinanced and understaffed.” Alexei Barrionuevo, Globalization in Every Loaf: 
Ingredients Come From All Over, but Are They Safe?, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2007, at B1. 
 38. GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 1. 
 39. Id. at 3. According to the GAO, this paperwork includes, inter alia, bonds posted with 
Customs by importers to allow movement of the shipment from port. Id. Additionally, the FSIS 
requires a health certificate with each shipment attesting to the product’s safety. GAO INCONSISTENT 
AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.  
 Both the FSIS and the FDA have the power to authorize the immediate release of the shipment 
into U.S. commerce or to decide that the shipment must be inspected. Id. at 1.  
 40. The FDA and the FSIS have penalties that are imposed for violations of the various 
inspection regulations. A common criticism of the FDA is that the penalties currently in place are 
ineffective deterrents of subversive and negligent behavior. A discussion of the penalty issue is outside 
the scope of this Note; however, for an overview of the arguments involved, see GAO UNSAFE 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Shipments Under the FSIS’s Jurisdiction 
The FSIS categorizes its border patrol duties as “reinspection.”41 
According to FSIS officials, the initial “inspection” of every shipment 
occurs when the FSIS conducts the requisite equivalency investigation and 
approves the facilities from which shipments are sent.42 
Once through Customs, all FSIS shipments must be delivered to FSIS-
controlled warehouses to await reinspection.43 At FSIS-approved import 
inspection stations, inspectors visually check every shipment to determine 
that the documentation and labeling are correct and that the shipments 
have not been damaged.44 In fiscal year 2003, the FSIS subjected about ten 
percent of imported food shipments to more extensive reinspection.45 
On shipments failing reinspection, the FSIS stamps “U.S. Refused 
Entry.”46 Customs and the importer are notified, and the shipment is either 
returned to the country of origin, destroyed, or in some cases turned into 
animal food, within forty-five days.47 The FSIS allows removal of the 
shipment from its warehouse only if the importer provides documentation 
demonstrating that arrangements for disposal have been made.48 Because 
all reinspected goods are stamped with the USDA’s official inspection 
mark, any unstamped shipment readily identifies it as one not yet having 
been subjected to reinspection.49 Shipments passing reinspection are 
 
 
IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 9–10. See also GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE 
EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 41–42. 
 41. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 17. 
 42. Id. at 17–18. 
 43. GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 1. 
 44. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 17. 
 45. FSIS Reinspection Data, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/Congress/Import_Equivalence/ 
Appendix_6.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
 Reinspection is dictated by the FSIS’s computer database, the Automated Import Information 
System (AIIS). USDA, FSIS Import Reinspection, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/ 
fsis_import_reinspection/index.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) [hereinafter FSIS Import Reinspection 
Policies]. Shipments are selected for reinspection both randomly and based on an importer’s history. 
Id. AIIS may assign various inspection methods, “including net weight checks of retail packages; 
examination of the container’s condition; examination for product defects; incubation of canned 
goods; and laboratory analyses for product composition, microbiological contamination, residues, and 
species. Additionally, FSIS randomly samples products at ports for drug and chemical residues.” Id. 
 46. USDA, Import Procedures for Meat, Poultry & Egg Products, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/ 
Fact_Sheets/FSIS_Import_Procedures/index.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) [hereinafter FSIS Import 
Procedure Fact Sheet]. 
 47. Id. The FSIS must approve any “diversion” request for the conversion of rejected shipments 
to animal food. 
 48. GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 3. 
 49. FSIS Import Procedure Fact Sheet, supra note 46. However, shipments from Canada bear a 
Canadian stamp. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/6
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released by the FSIS and the importer may thereafter distribute the goods 
in domestic markets. 
B. Shipments Under the FDA’s Jurisdiction50 
The FDA electronically screens all shipments upon their arrival at the 
U.S. border. However, a vast majority of those shipments are then simply 
released by the FDA into domestic markets without inspection.51 For 
example, less than one percent of FDA shipments were physically 
inspected in 2001.52 Furthermore, a House of Representatives 
subcommittee recently found that FDA employees in San Francisco have 
an average of thirty seconds to decide whether any of the hundreds of 
shipments reviewed each day require more extensive investigation.53 
In contrast to FSIS procedures, shipments under the FDA’s jurisdiction 
remain under the importer’s control throughout the entire inspection 
process.54 Once a sample of the shipment has been collected, Customs 
releases the shipment to the importer for transport to, and storage in, the 
importer’s warehouse, pending the FDA’s final decision regarding the 
shipment’s compliance.55 The FDA claims it lacks statutory authority to 
establish and mandate the use of FDA-controlled warehouses for shipment 
storage.56 
The FDA does not have a counterpart to the FSIS’s “U.S. Refused 
Entry” stamp.57 When a test sample fails inspection, the FDA sends a 
 
 
 50. The data for this section were gathered directly from the FDA, infra note 55, published in 
1996 and currently under review by the FDA in light of the Bioterrorism Act of 2002. The effects of 
this legislation on FDA import procedures are discussed in Part III of the text. 
 51. GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 3. 
 52. John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Remarks 
Before the Consumer Federation of America 25th Annual National Food Policy Conference: Food 
Safety and the Bioterrorism Legislation (Apr. 23, 2002), http://energycommerce.house.gov/press/ 
107rm4.shtml [hereinafter Dingell Conference Remarks]. 
 53. Merle & Abramowitz, supra note 9, at D1. 
 54. GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 3. 
 55. FDA/CFSAN, FDA IMPORT PROCEDURES (1996), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/import.html 
[hereinafter FDA IMPORT PROCEDURES]. For shipments it decides to analyze, the FDA sends a “Notice 
of Sampling” to both Customs and the importer. A sample is then taken of the shipment and sent to an 
FDA District Laboratory for testing. Id.  
 In some cases, usually involving perishable goods, the “FDA will select samples for testing and 
allow the shipments to continue in domestic transit—on the condition that the shipment be returned if 
FDA finds the shipment to be adulterated and refuses entry.” GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE 
EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. 
 56. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 18 n.11. 
 57. GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 7. “According to FDA officials, 
FDA does not stamp refused shipments because it lacks the statutory authority to do so.” GAO 
INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 40. 
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Notice of Detention and Hearing to Customs and the importer.58 Unlike 
the procedures followed by the FSIS, the importer then has ten working 
days to produce testimony affirming the admissibility of the shipment.59 If 
the FDA rejects such testimony, a Notice of Refusal is issued.60 The 
importer is then given another opportunity to move the shipment into 
domestic markets by proffering evidence from a “reliable laboratory” 
showing shipment compliance.61 Importers may choose their own 
laboratories for this purpose62 and may choose which products are used as 
test samples.63 At any of these steps, the FDA may approve the release of 
the shipment if satisfied that the shipment is safe for consumption. If the 
FDA still refuses entry, it relies on the importer to return the shipment to 
Customs within ninety days for re-export or destruction.64  
II 
As bad as you may believe FDA controls are at the border, the 
reality is . . . much worse . . . . As a result, imported food that is 
intentionally or unintentionally adulterated is much more likely to 
end up on America’s dinner table than it is to be detected and held 
at the border. This is true largely because FDA doesn’t have enough 
inspectors at ports of entry, but FDA’s own practices and lack of 
authority make matters worse.65 
A. Lack of Equivalency Authority Renders the FDA Unable to Allocate 
Sufficient Resources to Ensuring Imported Food Safety 
The FDA only receives thirty-eight percent of the federal food safety 
budget66 even though it is responsible for overseeing eighty percent of the 
 
 
 58. FDA IMPORT PROCEDURES, supra note 55. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 3. See also Marian Burros, F.D.A. 
Inspections Lax, Congress Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at C3 (reporting findings by an 
oversight subcommittee of the House of Representatives that the FDA “allowed importers to take 
possession of suspect goods and arrange for their testing by private laboratories that are not approved 
by the F.D.A.”). 
 63. GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 2.  
 64. Id. at 7. 
 65. Dingell Conference Remarks, supra note 52. 
 66. Outbreak Alert! 2005, supra note 2, at 2. See also USDA, FY 2005 Budget Summary 65, 
available at http://www.usda/gov/agency/obpa/Budget-Summary/2005/FY05budsum.pdf; FDA Office 
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nation’s food supply.67 Budget summaries for fiscal year 2004 show $899 
million allocated to the USDA’s food inspection program, but only $413 
million allocated to the FDA for similar purposes.68 In 2003, the FDA 
reported that “more than six million food shipments arrive in the U.S. each 
year,” and that figure rises annually.69  
This is a logical extrapolation from recent trends. The number of 
imported food shipments under the FDA’s jurisdiction more than doubled 
between 1992 and 1997, rising from 1.1 million to 2.7 million.70 To put 
these increases in perspective, consider that approximately 950,000 items 
were offered for import into the U.S. in 1985.71 This places a premium on 
the efficient and focused use of resources. However, the lack of 
equivalency authority forces the FDA to spread its limited resources too 
thinly. While equivalency authority allows the FSIS to shift much of the 
burden of ensuring the safety of imported foods under its jurisdiction to 
exporting nations, the FDA must shoulder the complete inspection 
responsibility at the U.S. border.72 
1. The FSIS’s Equivalency Authority Shifts the Burden of Ensuring 
Imported Food Safety to Foreign Nations and Allows for Efficient 
Use of Border Resources 
Any country wishing to export meat or poultry to the United States 
must apply to the USDA for eligibility.73 The FSIS can deny any 
 
 
of Financial Management, FY 2006 Budget Summary and Budget in Brief 124, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/ budget/2006/PDFs/consolidatedbudget.pdf. 
 The FDA received a one-time special appropriation of $151 million to facilitate its 
implementation of the provisions of the Bioterrorism Act of 2002. See McClellan, supra note 10, at 
202. According to McClellan, some of that money was used to “hire more than 800 new employees, 
655 of whom are earmarked for food safety activities in the field.” Id.  
 67. GAO, REP. NO. GAO-05-549T, OVERSEEING THE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY: STEPS SHOULD BE 
TAKEN TO REDUCE OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, 8 (May 2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05549t.pdf [hereinafter GAO OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS REPORT].  
 68. DeWaal, supra note 2, at 433. 
 69. FDA CFSAN, Ensuring the Safety and Security of the Nation’s Food Supply (July 23, 2003), 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/fssrepbg.html.  
 70. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.  
 71. Schultz Testimony, supra note 10.  
 72. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. 
 73. FSIS Import Procedure Fact Sheet, supra note 46. Eligibility determination is a two-step 
process involving document review and an on-site audit. A satisfactory document review is a 
prerequisite for an on-site audit. The document review evaluates the candidate nation’s regulations and 
laws. The USDA focuses on controls for five risk areas: residue; slaughter and processing; 
enforcement; animal disease; and sanitation. Id. 
 If the document review reveals an equivalent system, USDA inspectors visit the site to examine its 
production facilities, laboratories and training programs. Id. If the nation’s system passes inspection, a 
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eligibility application and is not required to solicit one from a foreign 
country. Once a country is eligible, it bears continued responsibility for 
certifying each individual export shipment, as well as for providing annual 
re-certification paperwork.74 Additionally, the FSIS reserves the right to 
suspend a country from the list if its food safety system falls below 
equivalency.75 For example, in 1998 Paraguay was suspended “because its 
inspection system was not adequate to prevent contamination on repeated 
shipments.”76 
The use of equivalency authority allows the FSIS to shift a significant 
portion of the burden of ensuring U.S. quality standards for all food 
exports to the would-be exporting country.77 Therefore, at the border the 
FSIS is primarily concerned with detecting superficial defects in 
shipments, such as improper labeling or transport damage.78 As a result, 
the FSIS is able to concentrate its resources on annual facility re-
certification reviews rather than ad hoc border patrol inspections.79 
2. The FDA Bears the Entire Burden of Ensuring the Safety of 
Imported Foods Under its Jurisdiction and Lack of Equivalency 
Authority Forces the FDA to Rely on Ineffective Border Controls  
Mandatory equivalency authority would allow the FDA to require, inter 
alia, sanitation and production information about foreign facilities and 
enforce standards akin to those required by the FSIS. According to the 
United Nations FAO, “testing products at the port of entry involves a 
concentration of inspection resources on the imported product itself and is 
an attempt to compensate for a lack of knowledge about the processing, 
hygiene, and sanitation practices of the producer.”80 Shipments of FDA-
regulated food arrive at the border virtually unknown.81 The FDA has no 
information regarding the conditions under which the food was grown, 
produced, handled or shipped.82 Therefore, the FDA must rely solely on its 
 
 
proposed rule to add the country to the eligibility list is published in the Federal Register, followed by 
standard agency rulemaking procedures, including a public notice and comment period. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 48. 
 77. See FSIS Import Procedure Fact Sheet, supra note 46 (providing that the burden for 
submitting annual re-certification paperwork rests with the exporting nation). 
 78. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 17. 
 79. Id. at 24. 
 80. Id. at 24–25. 
 81. The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 requires that FDA be given advance notice of shipments. 
 82. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. 
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border inspections to ascertain these facts to the degree necessary for 
ensuring that the food is safe for American consumption.83 Success, 
measured as allowing only safe imported foods to enter domestic markets 
and detaining contaminated or otherwise unsafe shipments at the border, 
depends upon inspecting a representative sample of shipments.84  
The percentage of shipments inspected by the FDA has fallen as the 
number of imports has risen. “Since 2003, the number of [FDA] inspectors 
has decreased while imports of food alone have almost doubled.”85 The 
current inspection methods are also ineffective even when employed,86 
underscoring the need for legislative reform.  
B. Consequences of the FDA’s Insufficient Allocation of Resources Due to 
Lack of Equivalency Authority 
Relying wholly on port-of-entry inspections to ensure the safety of 
imported foods87 has several serious and dangerous consequences for the 
American consumer. First, an overwhelming majority of shipments simply 
pass across the border without inspection.88 As the number of imported 
shipments has risen, the FDA’s inspection percentage has fallen, dropping 
from eight percent in 1992 to less than one percent in 2001.89 However, 
even these numbers may be misleadingly optimistic. In 1997, the FDA 
inspected 46,295 shipments, or 1.7 percent of the total imports for that 
year, yet only 16,048 shipments, representing 0.6 percent of the total 
shipments for 1997, were subjected to laboratory testing.90  
The FDA lacks the resources to employ enough personnel to properly 
supervise and oversee the rising number of imports. In 2001, 150 
inspectors were responsible for overseeing imports at 307 ports of entry.91 
 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Burros, supra note 62, at C3. 
 86. See text Part II.B. See also Burros, supra note 62, at C3 (“Unlike the Department of 
Agriculture—which . . . limits imports to 10 ports—the F.D.A. has no control over imports. Even 
though it has inspectors at only 90 of the more than 300 American ports, the food it inspects can come 
into any of them.”). 
 87. See text Part II.A.2. The FDA must do this because it lacks equivalency authority. GAO 
INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 22. 
 88. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 89. Dingell Conference Remarks, supra note 52. 
 90. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 25–26.  
 91. Dingell Conference Remarks, supra note 52. Even FDA officials commented on the 
disconnect between the amount of shipments arriving at the border and the resources available to hire 
inspection personnel: 
In 1992, [the FDA] received approximately 1.1 million . . . items of imported foods and had 
631 . . . Full Time Equivalent employees (FTEs) to look at those items. By 1997, our line 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 137 Goldstein book pages.doc12/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
150 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:137 
 
 
 
 
This is not a new problem for the FDA; between 1992 and 1997, “the 
average number of annual food shipments each [FDA] inspector was 
responsible for increased from about 3,350 to about 10,500.”92 In that 
same time period, inspectors for the FSIS experienced a more manageable 
increase; the “number of import entries per FSIS inspector rose from about 
1,236 in calendar year 1992 to about 1,645 in 1997.”93 Only 1,750 food 
inspectors were responsible for all the ports and domestic food-production 
plants in 2007.94 By contrast, the USDA employs about 9,000 inspectors.95 
A shipment that arrives at a port without an FDA inspector passes into 
domestic commerce unchecked.96  
Equivalency authority would allow FDA inspectors to spend less time 
on each shipment, thereby allowing them to inspect more shipments each 
year and thus ameliorating the pressure to conduct exhaustive inspections 
by providing a presumptive assurance of safety and quality.  
Second, the methods available for conducting port-of-entry inspections 
are ineffective. Contaminants that may be introduced into food at the 
foreign production and handling stages are often undetectable by visual or 
laboratory tests at the port of entry. Thus, pre-emptive inspections of the 
production facilities are necessary to effectively guard against these 
hazards.97 Even if laboratory tests were sufficient to detect most problems, 
American consumers would still be at risk: for example, the percentage of 
seafood imports sent for laboratory analysis has recently declined, from 
.88 percent in 2003 to .59 percent in 2006.98 
Third, the FDA’s reliance on importers’ self-reported data creates 
incentives and opportunities for importers to circumvent the FDA’s 
 
 
items more than doubled to approximately 2.7 million but budget limitations caused us to cut 
our . . . FTEs to 565[, of which] only 314 are . . . “operational,” with 112 actual investigators 
and 202 analyzing samples in the laboratories. 
Schultz Testimony, supra note 10. The practical effect of these numbers meant that, “in 1992 [the 
FDA was] able to physically inspect 8 percent of all imported foods. [In 1997], the [FDA] physically 
inspect[ed] only 1.6 percent of imported food.” Id. 
 92. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.  
 93. Id. at 26.  
 94. According to William Hubbard, a former FDA Associate Commissioner, this means that 
most domestic food-production plants are visited by an inspector once every five to ten years. See 
Alexei Barrionuevo, Food Imports Often Escape Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2007, at C1. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Dingell Conference Remarks, supra note 52. 
 97. See GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 24 (reporting a 
CDC finding that “both visual inspections and laboratory tests are inadequate to detect Cyclospora”). 
Conversely, superficial defects, such as improper labeling or violations of transport temperature 
guidelines, can usually be discovered through reasonable border and laboratory inspection methods. Id.  
 98. See Martin, supra note 25, at A1 (reporting the findings of Food and Water Watch, a 
nonprofit group based in Washington, D.C.). 
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efforts. Importers electronically enter data regarding incoming shipments 
on the FDA’s computer system.99 The FDA determines which shipments 
are inspected using these data, and the “paperless filers” are required to 
periodically submit paper documents for comparison.100 Though the FDA 
may remove importers from paperless status if their discrepancies between 
the paper and electronic data exceed ten percent, FDA records show that 
this corrective action is rarely, if ever, used.101 Importers have been 
discovered using this practice to their advantage by, for instance, tagging a 
shipment that would otherwise automatically be detained with the product 
code of one permitted to cross the border without inspection.102 
Fourth, conditional release103 and the FDA’s delegation to importers of 
both the selection of tested samples and the laboratories at which the tests 
are performed, leads to “substitution.”104 Importers can substitute safe 
products for unsafe ones during transport to a laboratory or when re-
submitting data to the FDA to show compliance of a previously-rejected 
shipment.105 Additionally, the FDA gives importers ninety days—twice 
 
 
 99. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 33. The FDA’s 
computer system is called Operational and Administrative System for Import Support (OASIS). Id. at 
16, 33. 
 100. Id. at 33. 
 101. Id. 
 102. The following is an example of the misconduct that was uncovered in a 1998 GAO survey: 
[A]n FDA inspector at one port of entry said that, while most errors are accidental, he has 
encountered problems with importers who appeared to deliberately avoid FDA’s inspections 
by using the wrong product code for swordfish, which is automatically held until the importer 
provides laboratory test results demonstrating that the product complies with U.S. standards. 
By entering a code for another type of fish, the importers hope that the on-screen review will 
not detect a discrepancy and the shipment will not be selected for inspection. 
GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 34. Alarmingly, FDA 
inspectors reported to GAO that, even when they encounter incorrect data “that appear[s] to be 
deliberate misrepresentations, they work with the importer to correct the entry problems and, in most 
cases, do not investigate the suspect filers further. They said that they view their role as teachers, not 
investigators.” Id. 
 103. See text Part I.B. 
 104. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 105. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 38. One example 
of substitution reported by the GAO included the following: 
On a shipment of frozen shrimp, Customs alleged that the importer removed a portion of the 
shipment that had thawed during transport before making the shipment available for FDA’s 
inspection. If the thawed shrimp had not been removed, FDA would have refused entry for 
the entire shipment because the thawing indicated that the proper temperature controls were 
not maintained during transport, and thus the entire shipment may be contaminated. 
Id. at 40. Customs discovered that importers in San Francisco, California, were engaged in “banking,” 
or “sharing the same acceptable product when they had to present a shipment for inspection.” GAO 
UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 5. 
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the time allowed by the FSIS—to return to Customs any shipments that 
are refused entry, affording importers more time to substitute.106 
Fifth, shipments rejected by the FDA occasionally enter domestic 
commerce as a result of ineffective containment procedures107 and 
communication breakdowns between the FDA and Customs.108 The 
FDA’s initial decision to refuse entry sometimes does not occur until the 
FDA receives the laboratory results, which may be several days, or even a 
few weeks, after the shipment was initially imported and conditionally 
released into the importer’s custody.109 Often, this is too late since the 
importer may have already sold the goods or may simply refuse to heed 
the FDA’s request for re-export.110 In 2001, the GAO reminded Congress 
of its earlier finding that “in a [Customs surveillance] operation called 
‘Bad Apple,’ about 40 percent of the imported foods FDA checked and 
found in violation of U.S. standards were never redelivered to Customs for 
disposition. These foods were not destroyed or reexported as required and 
presumably were released into U.S. commerce.”111 Furthermore, Customs 
is not always aware of the FDA’s decision to refuse entry of a particular 
shipment.112 The FDA claims it lacks statutory authority to mirror the 
FSIS’s practice of stamping “U.S. Refused Entry” on rejected shipments, 
which would help address this concern as well as help prevent 
substitution.113  
The weaknesses in the FDA’s current import procedures highlight the 
need to re-examine how the FDA regulates imported foods under its 
jurisdiction. Granting the FDA equivalency authority would be the most 
efficient and effective method of ensuring that imported foods meet U.S. 
standards for quality and safety. 
III 
Both the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and the HACCP system address 
important concerns facing the food industry. However, both regulatory 
schemes, individually and collectively, fail to provide the more generally 
 
 
 106. Id. at 7. Succinctly, “importers will distribute into domestic commerce shipments refused 
entry and substitute for re-export a shipment that arrives at a later date.” Id. 
 107. See id. at 4. 
 108. See id. at 7–9. 
 109. Id. at 4. 
 110. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 40. Penalties for 
such action are ineffective deterrents. See supra note 40. 
 111. GAO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.  
 112. See supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text. 
 113. GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 7. 
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reliable and comprehensive protection of mandatory equivalency 
authority. 
A. The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 
The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 was passed in response to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.114 Under the Act, the FDA requires 
advance notice of imported foods under its jurisdiction.115 Additionally, 
“entities such as the manufacturers, processors, and receivers of imported 
foods” must keep records that allow the FDA to identify the “immediate 
previous source and . . . subsequent recipients of food.”116 Although the 
latter requirement is generally directed at allowing the FDA to trace 
ownership of imported food in the event of intentional contamination, any 
heightened recordkeeping requirements also boost food safety oversight. 
The Bioterrorism Act of 2002 is a security (rather than a safety) 
measure; therefore, the most comprehensive solution to concerns of both 
food safety and food security117 would be to amend the FFDCA to give the 
FDA mandatory equivalency authority in addition to the regulatory 
powers granted by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002. Alone, the latter fails to 
address many of the potential hazards that jeopardize food safety, such as 
the sanitation conditions of foreign food production facilities. 
B. The HACCP System 
The Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) system is a 
science-based initiative geared toward improving and monitoring food 
safety originally developed by the FDA in the 1970s for astronauts as a 
way of preventing foodborne illnesses in space.118 Today, HACCP has 
 
 
 114. FDA, The Bioterrorism Act of 2002, http://www.fda.gov/oc/bioterrorism/bioact.html (“The 
events of Sept. 11, 2001, reinforced the need to enhance the security of the United States. Congress 
responded by passing the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002 (the Bioterrorism Act), which President Bush signed into law June 12, 2002.”) [hereinafter FDA 
Informational Page on the Bioterrorism Act of 2002]. 
 115. GAO OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS REPORT, supra note 67, at 4. See also Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 381(m) (2006), amended by Bioterrorism Act of 2002, supra 
note 29. 
 116. GAO OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS REPORT, supra note 67, at 4.  
 117. This Note addresses food safety concerns; namely, accidental contamination, often the result 
of unsanitary production facilities. The portions of the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 focusing on the food 
industry, however, focus on food security concerns; namely, a possible terrorist attack in the form of 
intentional poisoning of the U.S. food supply. 
 118. FDA Backgrounder, HACCP: A State-of-the-Art Approach to Food Safety (2001), 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/bghaccp.html [hereinafter HACCP: A State-of-the-Art Approach to 
Food Safety]. 
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been adopted as the international standard for food safety by Codex.119 
The FDA currently requires foreign plants exporting seafood to the U.S. to 
comply with the HACCP principles.120 
1. Overview of the HACCP Requirements 
HACCP guidelines require all seafood processors and importers to 
institute the seven HACCP principles.121 First, each processor122 must 
identify likely food safety hazards.123 If potential hazards are identified, 
the processor must develop a HACCP plan that, in addition to stating the 
potential hazards, administratively incorporates the remaining six safety 
principles: (1) critical control points (CCP) which control hazards 
occurring both within and without the workplace; (2) critical limits (safe 
operating restrictions) for the CCP; (3) monitoring procedures; (4) 
corrective action plans (if the processor has any); (5) verification 
procedures that ensure at least annual revision of the plan and review of 
current implementation status; and (6) a recordkeeping system 
documenting the processor’s monitoring, corrective actions and certain 
verification procedures.124 
2. HACCP is not a Fungible Substitute for Equivalency Authority 
HACCP is a far cry from being a solution to the problem of unsafe 
imported foods under the FDA’s jurisdiction reaching the American 
marketplace. As of 2004, the GAO continued to maintain that the “FDA’s 
system for ensuring the safety of imported seafood does not sufficiently 
protect consumers. . . . [T]he agency inspected about 100 of roughly 
13,000 foreign firms in 2002 and tested slightly over 1 percent of imported 
seafood products.”125 Though the system approaches food safety from a 
 
 
 119. Id. See also supra note 36 and accompanying text. The Codex Alimentarius Commission is 
discussed in more detail in Part IV of the text.  
 120. Press Handout, The Provisions of the Regulation: The Seafood HACCP Regulations (Dec. 5, 
1995), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/haccppro.html [hereinafter FDA HACCP Press Handout]. 
 121. Id. 
 122. “Processors” are all seafood-related entities in the food and drug industry, all importers, and 
all foreign processors that export to the U.S. The term does not include fishing vessels, common 
carriers, or retailers.  
 123. Id. If none is identified, the processor satisfies HACCP requirements as long as (a) the 
analysis is correct and (b) the processor reassesses when necessitated by a change in the work 
environment. Id. 
 124. Id. Additionally, a “senior firm official” must sign and date the plan, and reaffirm his or her 
signature at least annually and upon any modification of the plan. Id. 
 125. GAO FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING REPORT, supra note 13, at 7.  
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preventative perspective, rather than the reactive approach of relying on 
border inspections,126 it does so with a limited scope, in that it does not 
apply to all foods. And, while the current HACCP protocol would be put 
to its maximum utility if used in addition to, rather than instead of, 
equivalency authority,127 a true solution must be broad based, covering all 
foods under the FDA’s jurisdiction. That the FSIS chose to institute 
HACCP for meat and poultry on top of its equivalency authority supports 
the proposition that HACCP is most effectively used in conjunction with 
mandatory equivalency authority.128 
The FDA requires that seafood importers meet one of two conditions 
before being permitted to bring seafood into the U.S., the second of which 
is demonstrated HACCP compliance.129 The first condition, illustrating the 
agency’s preference for equivalency, is to acquire shipments from 
countries with which the FDA has entered into voluntary equivalency 
agreements.130 
The discussion in Part II.A.1 of this Note observed that the FSIS is able 
to efficiently deploy its resources because much of the burden for ensuring 
foreign producers’ compliance with U.S. safety and wholesomeness 
requirements is shifted to those foreign producers. Similarly, equivalency 
authority would allow the FDA to shift the burden for ensuring 
compliance with HACCP to foreign producers. Making an initial 
equivalency determination, followed by periodic check-ups, would 
certainly be less taxing on the FDA’s scarce resources than bearing the 
entire burden of ensuring continuing HACCP compliance from all 
importers.131 Additionally, mandatory equivalency authority would 
prevent the following error, uncovered in a 2002 survey conducted by the 
GAO: “in about 4 percent of the inspection forms, FDA investigators 
erroneously indicated that the exporting country had an equivalence 
agreement in place for seafood” and did not, therefore, inquire as to 
HACCP compliance.132 Moreover, in the absence of equivalence 
 
 
 126. See FDA HACCP Press Handout, supra note 114; HACCP: A State-of-the-Art Approach to 
Food Safety, supra note 118. 
 127. See generally GAO IMPORTED SEAFOOD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 24. 
 128. See Levitt, supra note 11, at 20. 
 129. GAO IMPORTED SEAFOOD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 24, at 2. 
 130. Id. 
 131. GAO IMPORTED SEAFOOD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 24, at 6. As of January 2004, the 
GAO “continue[d] to believe that equivalence agreements are one of the most cost-effective methods 
for ensuring the safety of imported seafood.” Id.  
 132. Id. at 16. These mistakes are all the more curious considering that, at the time, the FDA had 
not entered into such an equivalence agreement with any foreign country. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 137 Goldstein book pages.doc12/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
156 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:137 
 
 
 
 
agreements, the FDA relies on importers’ self-reported data to determine 
HACCP compliance,133 which raises previously enumerated concerns. 
IV 
Both the GAO and the CSPI have argued forcefully that the FDA needs 
increased resources and mandatory equivalency authority to effectively 
meet its safety and wholesomeness mandate.134 Members of Congress 
have also recognized the need for legislative reform, as evidenced by 
numerous proposed bills.135 FDA officials have pressed for equivalency 
authority.136 However, while the need for equivalency authority is a 
repeated theme, parties have suggested different means of achieving the 
desired goal of safer imported food.137 
 
 
 133. Id. at 3. 
 134. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. None of the proposed legislation advanced beyond 
committee level. See also, e.g., Imported Products Safety Improvement and Disease Prevention Act of 
2000, S. 2692, 106th Cong. (2000) (introduced in Senate); Imported Food Safety Improvement Act, S. 
1123, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced in Senate); Imported Food Safety Improvement Act of 1999, S. 
1126, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced in Senate); Imported Food Safety Improvement Act of 1999, 
H.R. 2055, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced in House); Imported Food Safety Act of 1999, H.R. 830, 
106th Cong. (1999) (introduced in House); Imported Food Safety Act of 1998, H.R. 4080, 105th Cong. 
(1998) (introduced in House); Safety of Imported Food Act of 1998, S. 1707, 105th Cong. (1998) 
(introduced in Senate); Safety of Imported Food Act of 1997, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced in 
House); Food Safety Assurance Act of 1989, H.R. 3292, 101st Cong. (1989) (introduced in House). 
 136. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 137. For example, the GAO recently suggested that control over U.S. food be consolidated under 
one agency, headed by a food czar. See generally GAO OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS REPORT, supra 
note 67; GAO, REP. NO. GAO-05-213, OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY ACTIVITIES: FEDERAL AGENCIES 
SHOULD PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE OVERLAP AND BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES (Mar. 
2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05213.pdf; GAO, REP. NO. GAO-05-212 FOOD 
SAFETY: EXPERIENCES OF SEVEN COUNTRIES IN CONSOLIDATING THEIR FOOD SAFETY SYSTEMS (Feb. 
2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05212.pdf. Members of Congress have submitted 
similar proposals. See, e.g., Safe Food Act of 2005, S. 729, 109th Cong. (2005); Safe Food Act of 
2005, H.R. 1507, 109th Cong. (2005). See also Outbreak Alert! 2006, supra note 19. For perhaps the 
most well-known treatment of the food safety issue recommending agency consolidation, see 
INSTITUTE OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD FROM PRODUCTION TO 
CONSUMPTION (Nat’l Acad. Press 1998). 
 Such a course of action, however, would require an incredible amount of government 
restructuring and likely result in years of confusion and uncertainty. See Merrill & Francer, supra note 
8, at 114 (“Any proposal to consolidate the federal food safety bureaucracy must take into account the 
statutory and institutional histories of the existing agencies, as well as the impact of such change at the 
federal level on domestic local governments and emerging international regimes.”). See also id. at 
115–18 (providing a table of the “Major Proposals for Reorganizing the Federal Food Safety 
Regulators Since 1949”). Strengthening the FDA’s authority under the current division of 
responsibilities is both practical and feasible.  
 Concededly, there is substantial overlap in the current regulatory schemes. However, that problem 
lies outside the focus of this Note. For an overview and critique of the overlapping responsibilities of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/6
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The need for mandatory equivalency authority granted through 
legislative reform is made more vital by the FDA’s recent position that 
current demands on its resources preclude it from pursuing voluntary 
equivalence agreements.138 If the FDA no longer believes it can allocate 
the resources necessary to negotiate these agreements, mandatory 
equivalency authority granted through an amendment to the FFDCA or 
separate legislation is the surest way of requiring U.S. quality for all 
imported foods. Of course, increased resources are also required to 
facilitate the implementation and enforcement of equivalency authority, 
but the new statutory mandate would ensure that the money is put toward 
that specific end. 
The discussion of food safety and equivalency authority is not unique 
to the United States. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures139 (WTO SPS 
Agreement) imposes an obligation on member nations to “enter into 
consultations with the aim of achieving equivalence agreements upon the 
request of other WTO member nations.”140 The U.S. is a signatory to the 
WTO SPS Agreement.141 Additionally, Codex urges countries to work 
together to achieve “the appropriate level of sanitary protection of the 
importing country, consistent with the principle of equivalence as 
provided for in the [WTO SPS Agreement].”142 Codex primarily develops 
food guidelines and standards and implements the Joint FAO/WHO Food 
 
 
the various agencies charged with food safety, see GAO OVERLAPPING INSPECTIONS REPORT, supra 
note 67. See also GAO FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING REPORT, supra note 13. 
 138. GAO IMPORTED SEAFOOD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 24, at 47 (maintaining that, due to 
“FDA priorities associated with implementation of the provisions of the Bioterrorism Act [of 2002] . . . 
FDA is not currently positioned to assign high priority to negotiating equivalence or similar types of 
agreements with the numerous countries that are currently exporting seafood to the United States”). 
 139. The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (WTO SPS 
Agreement), Art. 4 (1994), http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm. 
 140. GAO IMPORTED SEAFOOD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 24, at 12. 
 141. Id. 
 142. CODEX, GUIDELINE NO. CAC/GL 53-2003, GUIDELINES ON THE JUDGEMENT OF 
EQUIVALENCE OF SANITARY MEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH FOOD INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION 
SYSTEMS 1 (2003), available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/10047/ 
CXG_053e.pdf. Codex recognizes that: 
Application of the principle of equivalence has mutual benefits for both exporting and 
importing countries. While protecting the health of consumers, it serves to facilitate trade, and 
minimize the costs of regulation to governments, industry, producers, and consumers by 
allowing the exporting country to employ the most convenient means in its circumstances to 
achieve the appropriate level of protection of the importing country. 
Id.  
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Standards Programme.143 To that end, Codex publishes guidelines for 
developing equivalency agreements.144 
CONCLUSION 
The CDC estimates that approximately 76 million cases of foodborne 
illness occur in the United States each year, resulting in 325,000 
hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths annually.145 In 2000, the Economic 
Research Service (ERS) of the USDA approximated the cost from five of 
the most common foodborne bacterial pathogens to be $6.9 billion.146 For 
example, a 1994 Salmonella enteritidis outbreak traced to a national brand 
of ice cream infected 224,000 people nationwide and cost an estimated 
$18.1 million.147 According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, 
food imports more than doubled in the last decade, totaling $79.9 billion in 
2006.148 As the import share of foods consumed in the United States 
continues to rise, the risk of illness from imported foods becomes 
greater.149 
Currently, the procedures employed by the FDA to monitor imported 
foods under its jurisdiction, a category broadly encompassing almost all 
foods,150 are inadequate. Lack of equivalency authority forces the FDA to 
concentrate its scarce inspection resources at the U.S. border, which 
 
 
 143. Codex, FAO/WHO Food Standards, http://www.codexalimentarius.net (last visited Jan. 10, 
2007). The Programme focuses on the following areas: “protecting health of the consumers and 
ensuring fair trade practices in the food trade, and promoting coordination of all food standards work 
undertaken by international governmental and non-governmental organizations.” Id. 
 144. See supra note 35. 
 145. CDC, Disease Listing, Foodborne Illness, General Information 5 http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/ 
dbmd/diseaseinfo/files/foodborne_illness_FAQ.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2007). 
 146. USDA ERS: Economics of Foodborne Disease, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/ 
FoodborneDisease/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). The bacterial foodborne pathogens factored into the 
cost estimate are: “Escherichia coli O157 and other STECs (and associated hemolytic uremic 
syndrome), Campylobacter (and associated Guillain-Barré syndrome), Listeria monocytogenes, and 
Salmonella.” Id. 
 “The cost estimate includes medical costs, productivity losses from missed work, and an estimate 
of the value of premature death that takes into account the age distribution of those taken ill.” Id. For a 
detailed description of the factors that constitute the estimate, see USDA ERS Foodborne Illness Cost 
Calculator, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/foodborneillness/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2007). 
 147. GAO VOLUNTARY EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 11, at 2. This estimate included “$6.9 
million for medical care and $11.2 million in time lost from work.”. Id. 
 148. Barrionuevo, supra note 37, at B1. 
 149. See Schultz Testimony, supra note 10 (While the U.S. food supply is one of the safest in the 
world, “every year tens of millions of Americans become sick and thousands die from illnesses caused 
by both domestic and imported food. The increasing quantities of food that are imported into the 
United States has raised some significant questions about [the FDA’s] ability to protect consumers 
from potential hazards.”). 
 150. Except meat, poultry and some egg products. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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provides insufficient protection against possible foreign contamination. 
“Because such port-of-entry inspection and testing has been widely 
discredited as an effective means for ensuring safety, [the] FDA cannot 
realistically ensure that unsafe foods are kept out of U.S. commerce.”151 
Lack of funds renders the FDA unable to adequately staff ports with 
inspectors; additional authority must be coupled with a budget reflective 
of the FDA's responsibilities.152 The FDA needs the power to require U.S. 
quality for imported foods under its jurisdiction and the resources to wield 
and enforce that power.153 Mandatory equivalency authority, together with 
appropriately increased funding, ensures inspection of the hands that feed 
us, which is more effective than attempting to catch at the border unclean 
foods prepared in unknown conditions. 
Eric M. Goldstein∗ 
 
 
 151. GAO INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE EFFORTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 26. 
 152. Rep. Bart Stupak (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, commented that, “[e]ntry reviewers, investigators and 
compliance officers simply cannot keep up with the flood of imported food.” Merle & Abramowitz, 
supra note 9, at D1 (also describing the FDA’s food-safety program as “woefully understaffed”). 
 153. Part of the problem, according to William Hubbard, a former FDA official, is that “the 
FDA’s responsibilities have grown faster than the agency has. . . . When the FDA was established, it 
oversaw the import of such staples as flour and molasses, in which problems were usually easy to spot. 
. . . The FDA foods were not considered dangerous.” Merle, supra, note 21, at D1. 
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